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Performance Target Revisions in Incentive Contracts: Do Information and Trust Reduce Ratcheting and the Rachet Effect?/

Bol, Jasmin C.

Performance Target Revisions in Incentive Contracts: Do Information and Trust Reduce Ratcheting and the Rachet Effect?/ Jasmin C. Bol and Jeremy B. Lill. - Sarasota, Florida: American Accounting Association, ©2015. - v90 n5, pages 1755-1778; 26 cm.

The Accounting Review

ISSN: 00014826

Subjects--Topical Terms:
Performance

Dewey Class. No.: DPer 657.05 Ac27 Sept 2015 v. 90, n. 5

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